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CIVIL CODE REVISION IN QUEBEC*
Paul-A. Crkpeau, Q.C.**
"Laws with the patina which comes from accepted usage over a
long period of time should not be lightly cast aside and
paroxysmal legislation should be made to justify its right to reception into time-tested codes of general law."
J. H. Tucker, jr.'
Monsieur le Doyen,
Qu'il soit permis & un civiliste du Quebec d'exprimer, dans la
langue de Domat et de Pothier, toute sa gratitude pour l'insigne
honneur que vous avez bien voulu lui faire en l'invitant & donner la
troisieme des Confkrences cr6es en l'honneur d'un ardent civiliste,
M. J.H. Tucker, jr., dans cette prestigieusefacult6 de droit qui s'est
donna pour mission d'assurer la d6fense et le rayonnement de la
traditionciviliste sur cette terre de Louisiane qui fut jadis francaise
et qui le demeure par la teneur et l'esprit de son droit priv6.
Civil Code revision is a most significant chapter in the history
of a legal system. A discussion of this experience in Quebec is here
presented in the following manner: first of all (I) some of the difficulties encountered, then (II) the basic objectives of the Civil Code
Revision Office, and finally (III) the methods of operation in the
pursuit of these objectives.2
* This was the third of the Tucker Lecture Series, and was delivered at the
Louisiana State University Law School on February 28, 1974. A list of the abbreviations used appears in the appendix.
** Professor of Law and Wainwright Senior Fellow, McGill University; President,
Civil Code Revision Office, Province of Quebec.
1. Tucker, Tradition and Technique of Codification in the Modern World: The
Louisiana Experience, 25 LA. L. REV. 698, 718 (1965).
2. Certain views expressed here have been developed elsewhere by the author. See
in particular La renaissancedu droit civil canafiien, in I LE DROIT DANS LAVIE FAMILIALE,
LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE CIVIL,

xiii (1970); II Les principes fondamentaux de la

rkforme des regimes matrimoniaux, in Lots NOUVELLES 9 (1970); Vers une nouvelle
conception de la justice civile, RELATIONS no. 359, at 110 (1971); La r~forme 16gislative,

Canada,droit civil, in

TRAVAUX DU NEUVI9ME COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARIt

27 (1972); Le droit familial du Quebec: r~aliti~s nouvelles et perspectives d'avenir, 51
CAN. BAR REV. 169 (1973).
I should like to express my gratitude to my colleagues J.E.C. Brierley, J.W.
Durnford, and Y. Caron, who read the manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions.
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DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE QUEBEC CODE
REVISION

When one reads Plutarch's life of Solon,' one is told that, upon
presentation of his Tables of the Law to the people of Athens, he
made what may at first be considered as a surprising and singular
request. He asked for a ten-year "sabbatical" leave. After having
been actively involved in the revision of the Civil Code of Quebec for
a number of years, I am now in a position to begin to understand why!
For, if law reform is an absolutely fascinating and even unique
experience, it can also be a very difficult undertaking. And this is
particularly true of the task of revising the Civil Code of Quebec, the
responsibility for which I had the temerity to accept in 1965.
The difficulties encountered in law reform are many. I should
like to bring to your attention certain particular problems that we are
confronted with in Quebec and which render our task so difficult and,
in certain cases, so frustrating. These problems are of two kinds: the
first results from the constitutional division of legislative powers; the
second arises from the existence of a tremendous gap between the
Civil Code and the realities of present Quebec society.

A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

American jurists will not of course be surprised to hear about the
importance of constitutional issues, but in Canada we have our own
brand of constitutional problems. Indeed, as a result of the division
of legislative power between the central and local authorities in the
constitutional instrument known as the British North America Act
of 1867,1 every time we examine a problem, the first question we must
ask ourselves is whether it comes within the domain of Federal
authority or of Provincial jurisdiction.
The revision of the Civil Code does indeed pose difficult constitutional problems as a result, on the one hand, of the particular timing
of the first codification in the nineteenth century, and on the other,
of a rather peculiar constitutional division of legislative powers in
relation to private law. Let me briefly explain.
The Civil Code of Quebec came into force on 1 August 1866,
eleven months before the British North American Colonies united to
form a Federal State under the provisions of the British North America Act. The Civil Code purported to codify, upon the model of the
French Civil Code, the existing private law, both civil and commer3. See Plutarque, Vie de Solon in 1 LEs VIES DES HOMMES ILLUSTRES 203 (1951).

4. 30 Vict., c. 3 (Imp.).
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cial, of the then Province of Lower Canada.5
Now it happened that when the British North America Act came
into force on 1 July 1867, certain subject matters which had recently
been codified were placed under the exclusive legislative authority of
the Federal Parliament. But, at the same time, Section 129 provided
that the laws in force at the time of Confederation would continue in
force until modified or repealed by the competent authority.
This meant that certain areas of the Civil Code, although still
part of a codified system, could no longer be amended by Provincial
authorities. For instance, in the subject of family law,' the Civil Code
of 1866 provided a cohesive and comprehensive set of rules relating
to such matters as capacity and solemnization of marriage, the effects
of marriage in relation to persons and property as between consorts
and between parents and children, nullity and separation together
with the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage.7
Then, the Constitutional instrument of 1867 provided that, while
"Solemnization of Marriage" ' and "Property and Civil Rights"'
would remain under provincial jurisdiction, "Marriage and Divorce"' 10 would come, however, under federal jurisdiction.
This kind of division of legislative powers, where political considerations loomed larger than the exigencies of logic and coherence,
brought about constitutional uncertainty as to the boundary lines of
jurisdiction and created difficult problems of characterization. 1
It also contributed to a process of stultification of the Code's
rules: neither party-the Federal or the Provincial-was always sure
of its grounds, each fearing to tread on the other's jurisdiction, and
sometimes refraining from legislating for fear of the other's reaction.
Thus, while divorce is clearly federal, it is not an abstract concept;
it dissolves a marriage tie; it allows remarriage; it affects such
questions as parental rights, alimony; it requires the settlement of
5. See in this respect, An Act to provide for the Codification of the Laws of Lower
Canada relative to Civil matters and Procedure, 20 Vict., c. 43 (1857).
6. Another topical illustration is to be found in the struggle against lesion in
contracts of loan. The Provincial Legislature. has jurisdiction over the validity of a
contract, but the Federal Parliament has authority over interest. See Beneficial
Finance Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Morasse, [1972] C.A. 846; Boutin v. Corporation de
Finance Belvedere, [1970] C.A. 389.
7. See art. 185 of the 1866 Code. This article was amended in 1969, (S.Q. 1969, c.
74) as result of Federal legislation on Divorce (S. Can. 1967-68, c. 24).
8. 30 Vict., c. 3, § 92, para. 12 (1867).
9. 30 Vict., c. 3, § 92, para. 13 (1867).
10. 30 Vict;, c. 3, § 91, para. 26 (1867).
11. For instance, parental consent to marriage of a minor. Did it come under
"Marriage and Divorce" or "Solemnization of Marriage." Was it, in other words, a
question of substance or one of form?
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property rights and of gifts, pension, insurance or annuity rights. For
all such principal and incidental questions, where does "Divorce" end
and where do "Civil Rights" begin?
This division of powers has also, for a long time, inhibited law
reform. Both federal and provincial legislatures were prevented from
taking a comprehensive view of an area and dealing with it in a global
way for fear that the resulting legislation be declared ultra vires of
the enacting legislative body.
When Quebec amended the Civil Code in 1964 in order to confer
full legal capacity upon married women, 2 there were public utterances that this modification by the Quebec authorities was ultra vires
as coming within the "Marriage and Divorce" powers of the Federal
Parliament. A few years ago when a Senate Committee reported on
a divorce law reform, 3 they included in the "Marriage and Divorce"
section, inter alia, the settlement of property rights, but that subject
matter was not enacted in the subsequent bill as it was felt that this
might be going too far and would infringe on the provincial competence in "Property and Civil Rights".
Such was the situation when I took over responsibility of the
Civil Code Revision Office in 1965. One of the first Committees to be
created was that on family law. After being advised by an expert on
constitutional law that no one was quite sure what articles of the Civil
Code on family law were within the legislative authority of the Province, I sought and obtained authorization to deal with the whole area
of family law as if no constitutional problem existed and to submit a
report to the Quebec authorities with a recommendation that it be
implemented by the competent authorities within the limits, probably unknown to each of them, of their respective legislative jurisdictions.
I really cannot say how this difficulty will eventually be resolved,
but I firmly believe that problems of family law are first and foremost
human problems intimately related one to another and that we ought
not to allow constitutional issues to prevent a global and comprehensive reform in this area.
B.

THE "GAP" PROBLEM

Another major problem and source of difficulty in our task of
revising the Civil Code is the existence of a tremendous gap between
the basic policies as they are enshrined in the Civil Code and the
social realities which the Civil Code purports to regulate. Indeed, it
12. S.Q. 1964, c. 66.
13. Report printed by The Queen's Printer, Ottawa 1967.
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can be said that, until not so long ago, the underlying policies of the
Code reached far into the distant past, even back to medieval times
and, in some cases, straight back to Roman law. The simple truth is
that our Civil Code was, and to a large extent, still is, a monument
to the glory of past 'doctrines that may well have suited the mores of
bygone eras, the rural and artisanal societies of the past, but that no
longer suit the needs of a new Quebec society striving to catch up with
its North American destiny.
This phenomenon is perfectly understandable when one considers (1) the character of the Codification of 1866 and (2) the prevailing attitudes, until recently, towards the Civil Code.
1.

The Characterof the Codification of 1866

The Codification of 1866 was not meant to produce an "original
body of Civil Law";' 4 rather, it was essentially conceived as a redaction, a compilation of the "living laws"' 5 as they then existed and had
been applied for centuries in the Parlement de Paris under the
Coutume de Parisas modified by the great Royal Ordinances of Louis
XIV and Louis XV. Thomas McCord, the Codification Commission's
Secretary, described the Civil Code of Quebec "as an embodiment of
existing laws."' 6
To convince oneself of the truth of this statement, one has but
to read the preamble to the 1857 Act of the Legislature of the United
Province of Canada providing for the Codification of the Law of
Lower Canada (as Quebec was then called).' 7
One gathers from the text that the legislative intentions corresponded to a fourfold preoccupation: diversity of the sources of the
law; accessibility of the private law to all citizens, whether French or
English; inaccessibility of old French source materials; and
general advantages of Codification "'e la frangaise."'' It is easy to
14. See, in the case of Louisiana, Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition
in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REv. 357, 369-70 (1973).
15. For an exhaustive study on the Quebec Codification of 1866, see Brierley,
Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGILL L. J. 521 (1968).
16. SYNOPSIS OF THE CHANGES IN THE LAW EFFEcTED BY THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER
CANADA 4 (1866), [hereinafter cited as McCORD].

17. 20 Vict., c. 43 (1857): "Whereas the Laws of Lower Canada in Civil Matters
are mainly those which at the time of the cession of the country to the British Crown,
were in force in that part of France then governed by the Custom of Paris, modified
by Provincial Statutes, or by the introduction of portions of the Law of England in
peculiar cases; and it therefore happens, that the great body of the Laws in that
division of the Province, exist only in a language which is not the mother tongue of
the inhabitants thereof of British origin, while other portions are not to be found in
the mother tongue of those of French origin; And whereas the Laws and Customs in
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understand the specific mandate given to the Codifiers in Sections 4
and 6 of the same Act. 9 The moving inspiration behind the work of
Codification in the 1860's was therefore one of consolidation. 0
The net result of their efforts was that, although many substantive and important changes were made21 in various parts of the draft,
the Codifiers did not deem it their duty to embark upon an overall
appraisal of the fundamental policies underlying the main institutions of private law. As my learned colleague Professor Brierley wrote
in a careful study of the work of the Commissioners:
On the whole, however, the codification amounted to casting together various elements into a practical summary of the law,
differing as little as possible from what it formerly amounted to
and what was actually in use.22
In the main, therefore, the rules that were written into the Code
basically expressed, in codal form legal policies that then prevailed
in Quebec, and which had substantially undergone little change in
the previous centuries.
So it was that, as a result of seven years of labour, the "Ancient
laws and Customs of the Pr6v6t6 et Vicomt6 de Paris," which had
been introduced in New France in 1664 and maintained in force after
1763 when New France became a part of British North America,
force in France at the period above mentioned, have there been altered and reduced
to one general Code, so that the old laws still in force in Lower Canada are no longer
reprinted or commented upon in France, and it is becoming more and more difficult
to obtain copies of them, or of the commentaries upon them; And whereas the reasons
aforesaid, and the great advantages which have resulted from Codification, as well in
France as in the State of Louisiana, and other places, render it manifestly expedient
to provide for the Codification of the Civil Laws of Lower Canada: Therefore, Her
Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and Assembly
"
of Canada, enacts as follows: ....
18. See Brierley, Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGILL L. J. 521, 533
(1968).
19. 20 Vict., c. 43, §§ 4, 6 (1857): "IV. The said Commissioners shall reduce into
one Code to be called the Civil Code of Lower Canada, those provisions of the Laws of
Lower Canada which related to Civil Matters and are of a general and permanent
character, whether they relate to Commercial Cases or to those of any other nature;
but they shall not include in the said Code, any of the Laws relating to the Seignorial
or Feudal Tenure.
"VI. In framing the said Codes, the said Commissioners shall embody therein such
provisions only as they shall hold to be then actually in force, and they shall give the
authorities on which they believe them to be so; they may suggest such amendments
as they shall think desirable, but shall state such amendments separately and distinctly, with the reasons on which they are founded."
20. Brierley, Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGILL L. J. 521, 544 (1968).
21. See McCoRD 3.
22. Brierley, Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGILL L. J. 521, 566 (1968).
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found a new lease on life in the form of a Civil Code, which was
modelled after the French Civil Code but which essentially purported, as T. McCord put it:2"
[to] present[s] to us our civil laws rescued from antiquity and
chaos, and embodied in the form which renders them accessible
and intelligible to all classes of the people whose rights and property they control.24
2.

PrevailingAttitudes Towards the Civil Code

The Codification of 1866 was indeed a great moment for the Civil
Law in Canada. Quebec thus submitted its private law system to the
democratic process of legislative enactment. The formulation of policy therefore became and still remains essentially a legislative function, and legislative expression became a primary source of the law. 5
Another advantage was that the civilians of Quebec were thenceforth
in a position to reap benefit from the growing body of doctrine and
cases which had developed in France on the basis of the Code Napoleon of 1804.
But Codification carries with it its own drawbacks; the most
important is undoubtedly a tendency towards a crystallization of the
law which often produces a "freezing" of policy. This in turn may well
prevent the constant adaptation of the law to the changing needs of
a particular society and thus create a rather peculiar situation where
a growing gap develops between the law and social realities.
It can also lead to a potentially dangerous situation. A legal norm
that is no longer in touch with the realities and the mores that it
purports to regulate and control, can only lead to disrespect for, and
violation of, the law. This is why a society which has a codified
system of private law ought to provide for certain other mechanisms,
such as a vigorous academic tradition or a vigilant law reform
body, in order precisely to avert and offset the dangers of Codification and to allow for a permanent reevaluation of policy so as to suit
the changing needs of that society.
The necessity of such a permanent reevaluation of policy should
all the more have been felt in view of the fact that a number of
important things have been happening in the world since 1866!
Events of both local and world-wide magnitude have gradually but
completely-in Quebec as elsewhere-modified our ways of living,
23. McCoRD 3.
24. See also Brierley, Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGILL L. J. 521, 542
(1968).
25. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV.
357, 363 (1973).
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our sense of values, our attitudes towards the basic institutions of the
law, particularly in respect of the recognition of human rights, the
position of the family in society and the status and relative position
of the members of a family, the role of ownership, the sanctity of
contract, the basis of civil responsibility. As these changes came
about, one would naturally think that the Civil Code would have
reflected them.
Unfortunately, for a long time, such was not the case in Quebec;
and the story of the Civil Law in Quebec from 1866 and until recently
has been a rather disappointing one, for several reasons. One reason
which was generally accepted by Franco-civilians throughout the
19th century and by Quebec civilians in particular until very recently, is that the Civil Code was considered as the incarnation of
Reason and of Justice in human relations. With such an underlying
assumption, it could well be thought quite inconceivable that the
basic postulates of the Code were susceptible of modification. The
Code was thought and taught to be a timeless monument, not to be
subjected to the stress of social currents.
Another reason, which is more peculiar to Quebec civilians, is
that it seems as though the Civil Code came to be considered as a
sacred book that no one ought to touch for fear that our precious
French legal heritage might crumble to pieces.
There ensued naturally a period of immobility, of stultification
of our Civil Laws as expressed in the Civil Code. The absence of great
law schools and of a vigorous tradition of scholarship caused the Civil
Law to suffer considerably from a lack of vital nourishment and also
from an unwarranted and unjustified intrusion, in many areas, of
Common Law doctrines and vocabulary. The situation might well
have become hopeless. The Civil Law tradition might well have disappeared in spirit if not in the letter, had there not been a few ardent
civilians who showed the dangers of what Prof. T.B. Smith of Edinburgh aptly described as "servile acquiesence from within ... *26
Happily, the scales have been turning. Winds of good omen are
blowing. There are now signs of hope that point towards a renaissance
of Canadian Civil Law. One of these signs is a growing consciousness
and recognition of the necessity for a legislative reform of the Civil
Code. The need for such a reform was first felt in 1955, when, by an
Act of the Quebec Legislature, 27 a jurist was entrusted with the responsibility of providing a new draft Civil Code. In the years that
26. T. B. Smith, The Preservationof the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed Jurisdictions," in CIVIL LAW INTHE MODERN WORLD 11 (A. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965).

27. An Act respecting the revision of the Civil Code, S.Q. 1954-55, 3-4 Eliz. II, c.
47, §1.
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followed, preliminary reports were submitted to the Government of
Quebec but without legislative action.
In 1964, the Office, then under the chairmanship of Me A. Nadeau, Q.C., 5 submitted a draft project (Bill 16) on the capacity of
married women, which was enacted by the Legislature and became
law on July 1st, 1964. Since my appointment in October 1965 as
President of the Office, I have endeavoured to pursue and develop
the work done by my predecessors. But a fundamental question had
to be answered. Was the work to be essentially a revision of the Civil
Code or a reformation of the Civil Law? 9 There was no doubt in my
mind that, however more difficult it may be, the second course was
the one to follow. And I am happy to say that the Minister of Justice
readily accepted this fundamental option and gave full support, both
moral and financial, to this new orientation. Such support has continued even through successive changes of Government.
Of course, such a policy had important implications. First of all,
it meant-and it was indeed more and more recognized-that the
Civil Code of 1866 was not the expression of Justice, but of a particular conception of justice founded on certain basic assumptions which
may have been perfectly valid in past centuries, but which now no
longer corresponded to the mores of our times.
It also meant that Justice could no longer be seen as an absolute,
abstract and universal notion, but rather as a relative concept that
corresponds to a certain schema of social, moral, and economic views
about human relations at a definite moment in the life of a particular
society. 0 It equally implied that a society has the right-indeed is
duty bound-to reconsider from time to time its social values so as
to adapt its legal institutions to the changing needs and conditions
of social life.
28. As he then was. He is now a Justice of the Superior Court of Quebec.
29. For the difference between Revision, Consolidation and Codification, see
Brierley, Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGILL L. J. 521, 555-56 (1968). See also
Lawson, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at Codification, 2 INTER-AM. L. R. 1 (1960);
Tucker, Tradition and Technique of Codification in the Modern World: The Louisiana
Experience, 25 LA. L. REv. 698 (1965). The original version, in French, was published
in ETUDES JURIDIQUES OFFERTES A LFAONJULIOTr DE LA MORANDI9RE (1964); S. Bayitch,
Codification in Modern Times, in CIVIL LAW INTHE MODERN WORLD 161 (A. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965).
30. See Caron, The Legal Enforcement of Morals and the So-called Hart-Devlin
Controversy, 15 McGILL L. J. 9, 36 (1969): "One should remember that 'society' is as
vague a concept as 'morality,' 'justice' or 'equality', which are convenient abstractions
to work with, but are quite difficult to define in practice; since both law and morality
vary with the nature and structure of each society, absolute or definitive rules in this
field can only belong to Utopia."
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II.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CIVIL CODE
REVISION OFFICE
It is with the foregoing ideas in mind that over the past decade
the Civil Code Revision Office has been reforming the Civil Law of
Quebec. A true reform of the Civil Law requires the fulfillment of
certain basic objectives, both in substance and in form.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES

From the substantive point of view, our objective is three-fold:
1. Resolution of conflicts of interpretation; 2. Integration of civil
law statutory provisions; 3. Reappraisal of basic policies.
1. Resolution of Conflicts of Interpretation
First of all, it is necessary to solve the problems arising from
conflicting provisions of the Code. Many such problems have arisen
as the Courts have proceeded, through the haphazard chance of litigation, to determine the meaning and significance of the institutions
and terms written into the Code. Some of these conflicts are, of
course, merely the result of the natural growth and development of a
legal system. Others, however, result from the diversity of sources
and authorities and are thus peculiar to our system. One need here
only allude to the fact that certain parts of the Code, though clearly
of civilian origin, have nevertheless been interpreted by reference to
common law sources and authorities. The many bold warnings of Mr.
Justice Mignault, particularly when he was a member of the Supreme
Court of Canada, provided ample evidence of this type of conflict of
interpretation. 3
The Revision Office will make specific recommendations so as to
eliminate, in the words of the codifiers of 1866, "the evil of conflicting
judicial decisions and contradictory interpretations by
31
commentators. .1
2.

Integration of Civil Law Statutory Provisions

Another objective of the Office is to integrate into the revised
Civil Code the numerous provisions contained in statutes dealing
with civil law matters. It is indeed one of the present day features of
the Civil Law of Quebec that, while the Civil Code has for a very long
time remained practically unchanged, the Quebec legislature,
pressed by the new social and economic conditions of life in an in31. See in particular Desrosiers v. The King, [1920] 60 S.C.R. 105, 126; Curley
v. Latreille, [1920] 60 S.C.R. 131, 177.
31.1 See 7th report, 1864, p. lii.
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creasingly urbanized and industrialized community, has found it necessary to enact a large mass of statutory legislation dealing with
private law matters.
Such fragmentary legislation was often hastily conceived and
generally delivered in a form totally foreign to the civilian tradition
of legislative expression. It nevertheless frequently bore the mark of
an evolution in policy, and often provided solutions that were contrary to those found in the Code. As a result, a gap has been gradually
growing larger between the Civil Code and the Civil Law. And thus
the Civil Code has become less and less representative of the Civil
Law.
The Revision Office will attempt wherever possible to close the
gaps by recommending the insertion and integration into the revised
Code of such statutory legislation so as to harmonize policy and to
restore the organic unity of the Civil Law.
3.

Reappraisalof Basic Policies

The most important and most challenging objective of the Revision Office is the reexamination of the basic policies underlying the
main institutions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code of Quebec is still
to this day, in essence, the product of the moral authoritarianism, the
philosophical individualism and the economic liberalism of past centuries.
We have, therefore, embarked upon a frank reappraisal of the
policies underlying many parts of the Code. And if the policies are
found wanting, as they have been in so many areas, we are prepared
to recommend their rejection and the substitution of policies that
meet the needs of our times and of our society, always bearing in
mind that our legal destiny is that of a Franco-civilian tradition living
in a 20th century North American environment.
Professor Andr6 Tunc has very accurately described the spirit of
our reform endeavours when, in his preface to a remarkable thesis by
Miss G. Viney, he wrote:
I1 faut, certes, employer le mot r6vision dans son sens propre. I1
ne s'agit pas de tout bouleverser, mais de tout revoir, de se demander loyalement devant ces ph6nom6nes nouveaux, et aussi
devant les transformations techniques et psychologiques de la
soci6t6, ce qui, dans l'ancien, garde sa force et parfois sa vertu,
et ce qui g6ne l'61aboration de r6gles et de techinques nouvelles
32
qui pourraient mieux servir l'homme contemporain.
32. Viney, Preface to D9CLIN DE LA RESPONSABIITI9 INDIVIDUELLE at ii (Paris 1965).
[Translation: One must indeed use the word Revision in its proper (or etymological)
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In the pursuit of these objectives, we must, of course, have a sure
grasp of the new social realities to be regulated by the Code. And in
this respect, we are taking care to consult various persons and bodies
particularly interested in or dealing professionally with social problems. We must also rely on the data of the other social or human
sciences.
We must again be comparative-law-minded. The comparative
approach is indeed essential nowadays in any serious law reform. It
brings out very strikingly the relative merits of one's own legal institutions and techniques. It often shows that, beyond techniques and
jargon, legal systems are often closer than they are thought to be. It
allows us consciously to benefit from the experience of others.
More importantly, the comparative method brings us to realize
that the policies of the law are neither Civil nor Common, that they
are but the reflection of basic values shared by men and women on
human problems in a particular society at a given time. Wherever
they may come from, the best policies ought to be accepted or "received" if, after an objective and critical examination, they are found
to be preferable to one's own, provided of course thay are carefully
woven into the fabric, style and language of one's legal system.
B.

OBJECTIvES RELATING TO

FORM

Another objective of the Civil Code Revision Office relates to the
form of the new Code. Our ambition is to produce a Projet that will
state in as clear and simple language as is possible the basic rules
governing the private relations between citizens. It has been said that
the difference between a statute and a Code is that the first is drafted,
the second written. There may be some truth in this! It is my belief
that a Code must be written not for the specialist but for the ordinary
citizen with as little of the jargon as is compatible with accuracy and
precision of language.
I have often said that my greatest hope is, one day, to see a
citizen traveling in the Montreal subway, take out a pocket book
edition of the new Code, and watch him get absorbed in it with an
air of understanding.
We are spending a great deal of time on form. Indeed a reading
committee is specifically charged with the responsibility of ensuring
precision in terminology, uniformity in vocabulary and clarity in style
sense. It is really not a question of throwing everything overboard, but of looking anew
at everything ourselves: when confronted with new phenomena, as well as the technical
and psychological changes in our society, what, of the old, retains its strength and, in
certain cases, its virtues, and what prevents the elaboration of new rules and techniques of serving men and women of today.]
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in both French and English versions of the Projet. We do not want
the English version to be a mere translation of the French text. Each
version must be written in its own style. Furthermore, as each title
or chapter is ready, the Projet will be fed into a computer, and we
shall thus be in a position with greater certainty to ensure, from one
Book of the Code to another, uniformity of terminology and style in
both versions. This at least is one definite advantage we shall have
had over Tribonian, Portalis and Caron!
Of course, our aim is not to produce a Code that will procure
literary satisfaction to poets and novelists as was the case, we are
told, with the Code Napoleon, but there is no reason why the new
Civil Code of Quebec should not be written in simple, clear, and
precise language.
C.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Having stated our objectives, let me now illustrate by referring
to certain recommendations that have already been made or are
about to be made with respect to major areas of the Code.
1. Persons and Family Law
Book I of the Civil Code dealing with Persons and Family law
has, until recently, been little changed since 1866. Indeed, it can even
be said the the policies recognized at the time of Codification in that
part of the Code have been enduring for many centuries. Such policies reflected a certain type of conjugal society based on the legitimacy of the relationship, on the submission of the wife to marital
authority-one could not read the Civil Code a few years ago without
being reminded of the Epistle of Paul to the Ephesians' 3 -and finally
on the submission of children to the authority of the Paterfamilias
and the rejection of the illegitimate child as an outcast. Major policy
changes are contemplated.
a.

Marriage: a Partnershipof Equals

The basic policy with respect to consorts is to promote a conjugal
association founded on a real partnership of equals. This means full
legal capacity for both consorts-already the law since 1964;"4 it also
means full participation and equal responsibility of the consorts in
the moral and material direction of the family, and particularly in
decisions concerning the choice of the family residence, as well as in
33. Ephesians 5:22-23.
34. S.Q. 1964, c. 66.
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the determination of the interests of the children.
Another important step in that direction was taken in 1969,11
with respect to matrimonial property regimes when the Legislature
changed the legal regime from the community of property of moveables and acquests to a partnership of acquests.
On the technical level, this new regime attempts to combine the
advantages of separation and of community. Indeed the regime provides, on the one hand, for complete separation of patrimonies, and
complete powers of administration of one's property except for gratuitous transfers of acquests. On the other hand, the regime creates in
favour of each consort a right-characterized as a matrimonial right
-to receive eventually a half share in his consort's acquests, i.e.
generally speaking, the proceeds of work, together with the fruits and
revenues arising from all one's property.36
At the policy level, this partnership of acquests aims at giving
recognition to a new concept, a new philosophy of marriage, as a real
partnership which explicitly recognizes that the contribution of each
consort, though often of a different kind, is nevertheless a very real
one. More specifically, it seeks to affirm the very effective participation of the wife in the accumulation of the family's patrimony. It also
tends to make consorts realize that what is earned by one of them is
truly earned for both.
b.

Recognition of De Facto Unions

A modern Civil Code must also take into account the existence
of couples who live as man and wife in a de facto conjugal union
which may well be a very stable one. Should not the Civil Code take
notice of such unions and provide basic rules for the protection both
of the partners and of third parties in respect of alimentary claims
and contributions to debts incurred for the benefit of the family unit?
It might even be that a right of inheritance should be granted to the
surviving partner when the union has been involuntarily dissolved by
the death of the other. Such a right is perfectly conceivable in a
system where the devolution of estates is fundamentally based on the
theory of presumed affections.
c.

From Paternalto ParentalAuthority

The partnership of equals would also bring about two important
changes with respect to the children. The first would be a transfer
from paternal to parental authority-both parents having equal say
35. S.Q. 1969, c. 77.
36. See QuE. CIv. CODE art. 1266d.
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in the determination of the children's interests. This new parental
authority would no longer be considered as a form of potestas, but
essentially as the exercise of a responsibility in the sole interest of the
child's welfare. Within such a context, rules could be provided, in
case of abuse of authority, for the withdrawal of some, or even all, of
the attributes of parental authority.
The second change is really a corollary of the first and would
make parental authority include the correlative parental responsibility particularly with respect to damage caused by minors.
d. The Status of Children
An important aspect of the Civil Code revision concerns the status of children in our society. There is indeed a growing consciousness
of the necessity to define more clearly the rights of children, as is
witnessed by the United Nations Declaration of Rights of the Child.
Traditional rules in this area were based more on an obsession with
legitimacy and the legitimate transmission of patrimony than with
the development (epanouissement) of the child.
The Civil Law has for a long time meted out harsh treatment to
illegitimate children. It is my hope that, one day soon, the Civil Code
of Quebec will accept a new deal in recognizing that a child, whatever
be the circumstances of his birth, is a human person and deserves
equal treatment and opportunity in his civil relations with his authors. The adoption of such a policy means the elimination, to the
fullest extent possible, of such distinctions as legitimate and illegitimate children whether natural, adulterine, or incestuous, and the
recognition of a single status for children.
A new title on Filiation would enunciate the principle of equality
and set down rules concerning the relations between parents and
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, providing equal rights
with respect to support and maintenance, gifts, and rights of intestacy.
e. Reappraisalof the Law of Successions
In the area of successions, we are reexamining our system which
is based on the rule of absolute freedom of willing.37 A person in
Quebec may still bequeath all his property to any one whether that
be a charitable institution, a friend, or a society for the prevention of
cruelty to animals.
This system 8, inherited from English law in the Quebec Act of
37. See QUE. Civ. CODE art. 831.
38. See A. MOREL, LES LIMITES DE LA LIBERTP TESTAMENTAIRE no. 16, at 19 (1960);
H. RoCH, 5 TRAIT9 DE DROIT CIVIL DU QU9BEC 272 (1953).
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1774,11 is susceptible of producing very unjust results. Firstly, as disclosed in a survey made in 1968,40 consorts generally opted to marry
under the regime of separation of property instead of under the regime of community, thus depriving the wife of a vested interest in her
husband's property on the dissolution of the marriage. Secondly,
there do not exist in Quebec law any alimentary claims against the
estate of the deceased consort.
No wonder voices have already been raised in order to have the
law changed in this area. But how should one go about it? A first step
was to create a new matrimonial regime which no longer carries with
it undertones of incapacity or inferiority of the wife. Should the regime of partnership of acquests win favour,4" it could go a long way
towards the establishment of a just distribution of matrimonial assets. But that is not sufficient. Essentially, the problem is to determine as a matter of policy, whether to adopt a regime based on the
survival of an alimentary claim along the lines of the Family Maintenance Acts or Dependants' Relief Acts of the common law Provinces
of Canada, or to establish in favour of the surviving consort or of the
children, or of both, a forced share, as was the case in our system prior
to 1774 and is still the case in the Franco-civilian tradition.
Both systems have advantages and disadvantages. To force a
surviving consort or children to come to court "hat in hand" and beg
for maintenance is not entirely satisfactory. And yet to allow for a
forced and fixed share may be too rigid a formula to adopt in this day
and age. On this question, the policy to be adopted is not yet finally
determined. We seem to be.moving away from the forced share for
children, but we are thinking of one for the surviving consort on the
theory that, although in a different way, the consorts have contributed to the accumulation of the family patrimony and that it would
be unjust to allow a spouse to disinherit his consort completely.
2.

The Law of Obligations

The law of obligations is another area likely to be profoundly
affected in the new draft Code, particularly in respect of an increased
control over contractual freedom and change of emphasis in the basis
of civil responsibility.
39. An Act for making more effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec in North America, 14 Geo. III, c. 83 (1774).
40. See R. COMTOrS, TRArr THO1RIQUE ET PHATIQUE DE LA COMMUNAU'r9 DE BIENS no.
371, at 317 (1964).
41. Of course, the parties are still free to opt for a regime of separation of property.
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a. Increased Control over ContractualFreedom
The basic principle of our theory of contract is that of freedom
within the limits of public order and good morals." The contracting
parties are allowed freely to shape their relations to the best of their
mutual interests. The Codifiers, it is true, did not reproduce in the
Civil Code of Quebec, the famous text of Article 1134, par. 1, of the
French Code or of Article 1901, par. 1, of the Louisiana Civil Code:
Art. 1134, French Civ. Code
"Les conventions lgalement formes tiennent lieu de loi ekceux
qui les ont faites."
Art. 1901, La. Civ. Code
"Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on those
who have formed them."
But our Courts have nevertheless written the French text into the
body of our case law. As Mr. Justice Casey of the Court of Appeal
recently said in Hecke v. La Cie. de Gestion Maskoutaine Lt~e.13
Under our system freedom of contract is the rule, and the generality of this rule is limited only by the provision (C.C. 13) that one
may not in a private agreement contravene the laws of public
order and good morals.
This principle, which finds its justification in the philosophical
doctrines and economic theories of the 18th and 19th centuries, found
its way into the Code in a number of ways. Let me mention two which
I believe to be of significance for the purpose of our law revision
endeavors: the first relates to Codal standard form contracts; the
second concerns the regime of lesion.
(1.)

Codal Standard Form Contracts

Under the general theory of freedom of contract, the parties may
determine for themselves the number, extent and intensity of the
obligations by which they wish to be bound.
The legislator has, however, deemed fit-following in this a long
tradition which goes back to the Institutes of Gaius and of Justinian
-to give special attention to a number of contracts, in effect those
which were most frequently used in practice," and to provide for each
42. See together QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 1022, 1024, 13.
43. [1970] C.A. 225, 226.
44. See QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 1472-1595 (sale); 1596-99 (exchange); 1600-1700
(lease and hire of things and of work); 1701-61 (mandate); 1762 (loan); 1794-1823
(deposit); 1830 (partnership); 1929 (suretyship); 1966 (pledge).
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a standard regime of rights and duties. It must be remembered that
most of these provisions are suppletive in character; they are thus
characterized, except in a certain few cases of mandatory provisions,45
as implied contractual clauses which will govern the relations of the
parties but which the latter are perfectly free, by express stipulation,
to write out of the agreement.
This is still the system of the Code today in 1974, with the one
exception of residential leases, for which the Code was modified" to
provide a set of largely imperative rules with respect to the rights and
duties of the parties.
(2.)

Regime of Lesion in Contract

Not only were the parties free to negotiate the content of their
contractual relationship, but in giving a binding character to the
agreement the legislator took special measures to ensure the integrity
and the stability of contract. The most important single measure was
to rule out lesion as a cause for annulment of contracts entered into
by persons who were of age and under no incapacity.
Article 1012, of the Civil Code still stands as a monument to the
glory of "laissez faire":
Persons of the age of majority are not entitled to relief from their
contracts for cause of lesion only.
It may well be that such a regime of contract, when established in
1866, was perfectly justifiable in an artisanal and rural society; however, things have changed since the advent of the Industrial Revolution! 7
Indeed, at the very moment that the legislator was giving strong
approval to the theory of freedom of contract, new social and economic forces were at work which gradually undermined the accuracy
of the assumptions that served as the basis for such a theory. Industrialization and the concentration of economic forces showed fairly
quickly, at least in the area of contract, that our system was based
on a pretty idealistic or abstract conception of the equality of men.
It became apparent that juridical equality was very often only a
myth. The economic and social superiority of one party was such that
although there was consent-and therefore juridical equality-the
contract had often become what Saleilles called a "contrat
45. See, e.g., QUE. CIv. CODE art. 1509.

46. See An Act respecting the lease of things, S.Q. 1973, c. 74 assented to on 22
December 1973 (now being new articles 1600 to 1665 in the Title of Lease of Things).
47. SeeYntema, The Law of Obligations in CIVIL LAW INTHE MODERN WORLD 68

(A. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965).
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d'adh~sion" where one party in fact was in a position to impose his
8
will on the other.4
Such tremendous changes brought about a complete change in
the role of the State with respect to freedom of contract. State interventions were very limited indeed in the Code of 1866 and were considered, as it were, as a extremely regrettable concession to the requirements of public order and good morals in what was otherwise a
sanctuary of private interests. But gradually and increasingly, the
State assigned to itself a new role, that of promoter of "justice in
contract," which has led to active interventions in practically all
fields of contractual relations so as to restrict not so much the freedom of the parties but the abuse of freedom, and to restore some real
measure of equality between the parties.49
At long last, the words of Lacordaire, uttered in the middle of
the nineteenth century, were being heeded:
Entre le fort et le faible, c'est la libert6 qui opprime; c'est la loi
qui afjranchit.
In Quebec as elsewhere, statutory interventions have introduced
different modes of restricting contractual freedom: legislative, administrative, and judicial controls.
Legislative Control. In certain areas, such as insurance policies
and residential leases, the legislator has directly intervened in the
contractual relationship by imposing statutory conditions of an imperative character out of which the parties are no longer free to contract.
Administrative Control. In other areas, the legislative intervention has been indirect and has taken the forms of administrative
control through the creation of Boards empowered closely to regulate
contractual relations. This has been particularly the case in such
fields as public utilities, e.g., transportation, telecommunications.
Judicial Control. The legislator has provided the Courts with the
power to supervise contracts and annul or modify conditions of a
contract which appear inequitable. As Dean Ripert once wrote, 5
48. For an early grasp of the problem, see Hall, Employer's Liability for
Negligence, 7 R.L.N.s. 513 (1900).
49. See G. RIPERT, LA RkGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES no. 61, at 105
(4th ed. 1949).
50. See, e.g., Insurance Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 295, § 240 (statutory provisions in fire
insurance policies); S.Q. 1973, c. 74 (a recent standard form residential lease); QUE.
CIV. CODE arts. 1600 et seq.
51. G. RIPERT, LA RtGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES no. 65, at 114 (4th
ed. 1949).
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"Judges are turned into 'Ministers of Equity.'" Such judicial control
has been gradually introduced in specific instances, such as in cases
of accidents causing bodily injuries," rent control,53 transactions concerning securities, 5 loans,55 and credit operationsA'
All such legislative enactments, the purpose of which has really
been to reintroduce the concept of lesion in contracts, give rise to two
kinds of observations. Firstly, it must be realized that this striking
evolution has only just begun to find its way into the Civil Code. It
is indeed ironical to note that the Civil Code still preserves the liberal
and individualistic character of the 19th century while the legislator
has by statutory legislation considerably reduced the scope of Civil
Code article 1012 to the point that the rule may well state the exception.
The second observation is that the concept of lesion varies considerably from statute to statute. In certain cases, the traditional
word lesion is used in its normal meaning which conveys, as it does
in article 1860 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the idea of a discrepancy
between the value of the prestations-an objective test of lesion.57
Yet in another instance, in which one can readily detect the
influence of the Unconscionable TransactionsRelief Acts schemes of
the common law provinces 5 or of the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 a
court may reduce or annul the monetary obligations of a loan if "it
finds that, having regard to the risk and to all the circumstances, they
make the cost of60 the loan excessive and the operation harsh and
unconscionable."
. In the recent Consumer Protection Act, 6 . applying to contracts
involving credit and "itinerant solicitation contracts," sec. 118 states
that
Every consumer whose inexperience has been exploited by a mer52. See QUE. CIv. CODE art. 1056b, para. 4, introduced by S.Q. 1940, c. 68.
53. An Act respecting the regulation of rentals, S.Q. 1950-51, 14-15 Geo. VI, c. 20,
§ 29.
54. See Securities Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 274, §§ 35(g), 50.
55. See QUE. CIv. CODE art. 1040c, introduced by S.Q. 1964, c. 67; Boutin v. Corp.
de Finance Belvedere, [1970] C.A. 389.
56. See Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1971, c. 74, § 118.
57. QUE. Civ. CODE art. 1056b, para. 4.
58. See R.S.O. 1970, c. 472.
59. See UNIFOaRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (unconscionable contract or clause).
60. See QUE. CiV. CODE art. 1040c; Beneficial Finance Co. of Canada Ltd. v.
Morasse, [1972] C.A. 846; Boutin v. Corporation de Finance Belvedere, [1970] C.A.
389. See also Les Restaurants La Nouvelle Orlans Inc. v. Roynat Lte, C.S. (Quebec
9829) April 18, 1974.
61. S.Q. 1971, c. 74.
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chant may demand the nullity of the contract or a reduction in
his obligations if they are greatly disproportionate to those of the
merchant.
In the Securities Act,"2 a recourse based on lesion requires three
conditions: (a) a dangerously hazardous speculative transaction;
(b) abuse of the credulity, ignorance, weakness or manifest inexperience in business of a person incapable of estimating the risk involved
in the transaction; (c) a serious prejudice.
Confronted with such illustrations of fragmentary legislation, we
wonder whether we ought not simply to recommend the abrogation of Civil Code article 1012, and the reintroduction, in the general
law of contract, of a theory of lesion as a ground for annulment of
contract or for either reduction or increase of obligations. But, in
doing so, we feel that we certainly cannot return to the traditional
rigid rules of lesion based on a fixed percentage of value such as the
1/4 rule in cases of partition 3 or the 7/12 rule in case of sale of immoveables. 4
So we are thinking of a general theory of lesion based on two
criteria: (1)
a serious disproportion between prestations, and
(2) resulting from imposition. In so doing, we believe that a proper
balance might be struck between equity and stability in contract, a
just balance between the powerful and the weak, so as to ensure, as
Dean Ripert once put it,5 that no longer shall justice be founded on
contract, but rather contract on justice.
b.

Basis of Civil Responsibility

In the area of Civil Responsibility, one of the basic problems is
to reexamine the basis of liability. Should liability for damage remain
essentially a system based on fault, as expressed in Civil Code article
1053-the equivalent of Code Napoleon articles 1382 and 1383, and
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315-or should there be a shift from
fault to risk?
While it seems quite reasonable to retain the general principle
that every person capable of discernment is bound to act with reasonable diligence, there are certain cases which must be dealt with more
severely, as the hazards and dangers of life in society are ever increasing and the role of liability insurance is more clearly perceived."
62. See R.S.Q. 1964, c. 274, §§ 35(g), 60.
63. See CODE NAPOLEON art. 887; LA. CIv. CODE art. 1861, para. 1.
64. See CODE NAPOLEON art. 1674; LA. Civ. CODE art. 1861, para. 2.
65. See G. RIPERT, LA RGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES no. 73, at 127
(4th ed. 1949).
66. See H. Yntema, The Law of Obligations, in CIVIL LAW INTHE MODERN WORLD
72 (A. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965).
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Illustrations may be found in such areas as that of duties between
neighbours, products liability and automobile accidents.
(1.)

Legal Duties between Neighbours

The new Civil Code might well recognize a special duty as between neighbours whereby one would be held responsible for any
"excessive" damage, irrespective of all diligence exercised by the
debtor of the duty. Such a duty, which is close to the common law
concept of nuisance, has already been accepted by our Courts 7 and
could well be given legislative recognition.
(2.)

Legal Duties Relating to Products Liability

Again, with respect to what is now known as the problem of
products liability, there would seem to be no reason why the manufacturer should not be under a legal duty towards the ultimate consumer-and quite irrespective of contract-to warrant against any
latent defects in the conception, the production or the presentation
of his product.
A most curious phenomenon has occurred in this area. In Pothier's time, it may have been sufficient to impose such warranty on the
seller who, more often than not, was also generally the manufacturer
of the product, and the doctrine of spondet peritiam artis applied
quite naturally to the seller-manufacturer. Today, where there is no
longer a direct contractual relationship between the manufacturer
and the ultimate consumer, the irony of the situation is that the
manufacturer (qua seller) owes a contractual duty of warranty to a
person-wholesale dealer or retailer- for whom it was not intended,
and owes no such duty to the person in favour of whom it was really
meant. It would therefore appear reasonable to impose upon the manufacturer a legal duty of warranty towards the ultimate consumer of
the product, leaving it to the consumer to choose whichever remedy
is best available to him-either a direct contractual warranty claim
against the seller or a direct extra-contractual warranty claim against
the manufacturer.
(3.)

Legal Duties Relating to Automobile Accidents

With respect to automobile accidents, much is being said and
written these days about various plans to introduce a no-fault system
of compulsory indemnification of victims. In view of the fact that a
Special Committee has been set up in Quebec to look into the whole
matter of automobile liability insurance, the Civil Code Revision
67. See Katz v. Reitz, [1973] C.A. 230, conf. C.S. (Montreal - 719, 611) 21 Feb.
1969.

1974]

CIVIL CODE REVISION IN QUEBEC

Office will first wish to examine the report of the Committee which
proposes the introduction of a no-fault system of indemnification
based on a compulsory insurance scheme." But, for the moment anyway, it seems that our system must, at the very least, accept two
basic propositions:
i. A strict liability imposed on the owner of a car involved in
an automobile accident, with avoidance of liability only by proof of
a fortuitous event or irresistible force other than those that might
result from the state of health of the driver or the condition of the
vehicle.
ii. A compulsory insurance scheme whereby no one could own
or drive a car without having adequate insurance coverage for third
party and personal injury claims.
3.

The Law of Property

In the area of the law of property, the Revision Office is about
to propose that two bold steps be taken, both of them contrary to the
traditional rules of the Civil Law. Firstly, the integration into the
Civil Code of a general concept of fiduciary ownership alongside absolute ownership; secondly, the recognition, as a matter of principle, of
the hypothecation of moveables.
a.

Fiduciary Ownership

It is a simple fact of life that every day in Quebec, trusts of one
kind or another are being created not only for family purposes, but
also for business, investment, and other commercial purposes; yet
such instruments generally provide a clause that the trust shall be
governed by the laws of the neighbouring Common Law Province of
Ontario. The reason of course, is very simple. Our laws do not as yet
allow us to achieve the various objectives rendered possible by the
concept of trust.
Now in this area as in others, the pressure of social forces resulted
in the introduction, in the Civil Law of Quebec" of the concept of
trust in the Civil Code Title on gifts inter vivos or by wills. 0 Also, in
the creation of trust companies" it was specifically provided that they
were authorized inter alia, "to accept, fulfill and execute all legal
trusts . . . ."It is nevertheless true to say that Quebec civilians have
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Rapport du Comit6 d'6tude sur l'assurance automobile, Quebec, (1974).
S.Q. 1879, 42-43 Vict., c. 29. Inserted in the Civil Code in 1888.
QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 754-981.
R.S.Q. 1964, c. 287.
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never felt at ease with the notion of trust.
Both writers" and Courts73 have wrestled with the concept of
trust and tried to insert it into the traditional framework of ownership
in the Civil Law, with the result that no one seems quite sure today
whether the trust property is vested in the trustee or in the beneficiaries, and whether the trustee is really an owner or merely a depositary or executor charged with the administration of another person's
property.74 Also the limited scope within which the trust can operate
(gifts and wills, and trust for bondholders) has considerably affected
and restricted its usefulness:
It is with these ideas in mind that the Civil Code Revision Office
has constituted a Committee whose mandate is to report and prepare
a draft on a new chapter entitled Fiduciary Ownership to be inserted
into the Civil Code in the Book on property. Thus, the Projet would
provide for two kinds of ownership, personal and fiduciary: the
first dealing with the traditional notion of property; the second providing for a considerably expanded notion of trust to meet the needs,
both commercial and non-commercial, of a modem Quebec society
living in a North American environment.
And so the Trusts Committee of the Office, with the advice of
an expert on Anglo-Canadian Trusts, is in the process of integrating
the notion of fiduciary ownership within the fabric of the Civil Law.
And may I say here that the work of the Committee is considerably
facilitated by the Louisiana experience, so much so that each article
of the report is written in the light of the corresponding provision of
the Louisiana Trust Code. And no doubt, as soon as the draft is
completed later this year, my colleagues on the Committee will wish
to seek the critical observations of Louisiana experts in this area.
b.

Hypothecation of Moveables

With respect to the hypothecation of moveables, we intend to
recommend the rejection of the traditional rule of Civil law, best
expressed in the famous article 170 of the Coutume de Paris:
Meubles n'ont point de suite par hypothbque, quand ils sont hors
5
de la possession du d~biteur.1
72. See, e.g., 5 P. MIGNAULT, LE DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 155 (1901); see also M.
FARIBAULT, TRArrg DE LAFIDUCIE nos. 54, 55, 106 (1936); Faribault, De l'acte de fiducie,
66 R. DU N. 335, 387 (1964); Graham, Some Peculiaritiesof Trusts in Quebec, 22 R.
Du B. 137 (1962); Mankiewicz, La fiducie qu~becoise et le Trust de Common Law, 12
R. DU B. 16 (1952); Mignault, A propos de fiducie, 12 R. Du B. 73, (1933-34).
73. See, e.g., Curran v. Davis, [1933] S.C.R. 283; Lalibert6 v. Larue, [1931]
S.C.R. 7, 16, 20; Reford v. National Trust Co., [1968] B.R. 689, 697.
74. See particularlyQUE. CIV. CODE arts. 981a, 981b.
75. See Que. Civ. CODE art. 2022. See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3281, 3289.
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Translation: Movables are not subject to pursuit by mortgage when
they are out of the possession of the debtor.
Such is still the basic rule of our Code under which a creditor's
security, apart from privileges,7" is obtainable only by hypothecation
78
of immoveables 77 or by pledge of moveables.
It is, however, interesting to note that the pressure of economic
interests and the requirements of business transactions in Quebec, as
has been the case in Louisiana, 7 have forced exceptions to be made
to the basic principle. 0 The Federal Bank Act"' allows a mortgage on
moveables. Again, the Quebec Special CorporatePowers Act"2 allows
joint stock companies to hypothecate present or future moveable
property owned in Quebec.
And even more recently, the Civil Code was amended in 19401
and in 1962,84 to introduce two new kinds of non-possessory security
rights: one, the agricultural pledge of farm produce, present and future, and farm implements and machinery; 5 the second form of security is known as the "Commercial pledge"8 of machinery and equipment pertaining to a business.
Now, if it has been felt necessary to introduce such a security
device in particular areas, the question is whether the Civil Law of
Quebec is not ripe for the introduction of a general doctrine concerning the hypothecation of moveables.
And after a careful examination of North American practices,
particularly under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
recent Ontario Personal Property Security Act,87 the Committee on
the law of security is about to submit its report recommending the
establishment of a general system of hypothecs upon moveable as
76. See QuE. CIv. CODE arts. 1983 et seq.
77. See QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 2016 et seq..
78. See QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 1966 et seq..
79. See Sachse, Report to the Louisiana Law Institute on Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code: I and 11, 41 TUL. L. REV. 505, 785 (1967); Daggett, Dainow,
Herbert and McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of
Louisiana, 12 TuL. L. REV. 12, 36 (1937).
80. See Caron, L'article 9 du Code uniforme de commerce peut-il tre export?
in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW 375 (1969).
81. R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1, §88.
82. R.S.Q. 1964, c. 275, §§ 22-36. (first introduced as a general statute in 1914).
83. An Act respecting the pledge of agricultural property, S.Q. 1940, 4 Geo. VI, c.
69 introducing QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 1979a to 1979d.
84. See An Act respecting pledge, S.Q. 1962, c. 57, introducing QuE. Civ. CODE
arts. 1979e to 1979k.
85. See QUE. CIv. CODE art. 1979a.
86. See QuE. Civ. CODE art. 1979e.
87. R.S.O. 1970, c. 344.
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well as upon immoveable property, together with the necessary technical requirements such as a modem computerized system of registration of hypothecary rights which will ensure the protection of creditors by a proper system of identification of the secured property. ,
In doing so, our Committee has been greatly and consciously
influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code. But once the basic
policy was accepted, it was then a question of civilianizing the institution by adapting it carefully to our system of creditors' rights, and
by weaving it into the fabric and language of the Civil Law.
D.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

I have given you specific illustrations of some of the changes that
we are about to recommend to the Government of Quebec. If they are
accepted, the new Civil Code of Quebec will bear little resemblance
with the Code of 1866, and the Civil Law of Quebec will have undergone far reaching modifications.
But the point that I should like to emphasize here is that the
adaptation of our Civil Law to the needs of our society cannot be
regarded as a break with the great civilian tradition of past centuries.
In fact, we shall only be doing what our predecessors themselves have
done. For we must indeed bear in mind that the Civil Law, as Prof.
F. H. Lawson, of Oxford, has so admirably shown in his Michigan
lecture, "A Common Law Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law,"88 is itself
a mixture of Roman institutions and techniques, Germanic customs
and Canon law principles.
Can it really be said that the Civil Law became less civilian
when, in the Middle Ages under the influence of the canon lawyers,
the principle of consensualism (as expressed in the maxim "solus
consensus obligat") and the doctrine of cause which was subsequently developed, emerged as the new bases for contractual obliga9
tions?
Can it really be said that French Civil Law became less civilian
when Pothier lent his authority to the rationalization of the distinction between delictual and quasi-delictual responsibility based on the
voluntary or the involuntary act of the wrongdoer? It may be heresy
to our Scottish and South African brethren, but isn't it still quite
civilian?
Can it also be said that the French, Quebec and Louisiana Civil
Law became less civilian when they rejected the old maxim
"Traditionibus dominia rerum non nudis pactis transferuntur"(the
88. Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Law School, November 1953.
89. See David, Cause et Consideration, in 2 M9LANGES MAURY 111 (1960).
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ownership of things is transferred by delivery, not by mere agreement) and accepted the basic policy that a contract may, by the sole
consent of the parties, transfer the ownership of property both moveable and immoveable?
Can it be said that the Civil Law of Quebec became less civilian
when in the Codification of 1866 numerous changes were made in
order to facilitate the free disposal of property; 0 when, in 1915, it
considerably enhanced a wife's inheritance rights by making her a coheir with her children to her consort's estate;" and when, in 1969, it
replaced the old community of property by a regime of partnership
of acquests? 2
My answer is very simply: no. For I firmly believe that the Civil
Law is not just a particular set of rules laid down once for all time
either in the Institutes or in the works of Domat or of Pothier.
As Professor Ren6 David told us in Montreal in 1966, on the
occasion of the centennial celebrations of our Codification, the Civil
law is essentially "un style": it is a certain way of conceiving, of
expressing and of applying a rule of law whatever be the policies it
wishes to recognize at a certain time in the history of a country. 3
I refuse to consider the Civil Law, and its legislative expression,
the Civil Code, as a monument to the glory of past centuries, as a
museum of legal antiques or as a piece of legal folklore.
The Civil Law is and must be a living body capable of responding
to the needs of a modem society. The Civil Law, which has now
endured for centuries through many changes, is rich enough and mature enough to bear, now in Quebec as has been done in the past and
is being done elsewhere, a reappraisal and hopefully in many areas a
renewal of basic policies.
III.

THE METHODS OF OPERATION OF THE CIVIL CODE
REVISION OFFICE

Since I assumed general responsibility, the revision of the Civil
Code has been conceived of as a process of collective thinking, start90. McCoRD at 5: "Of these changes, it may be remarked at the outset that they

are not of a subversive character, or likely to disturb existing relations or to clash with
prevailing notions. They are on the contrary of a nature to harmonize with the ideas
of the present day, and to adapt our ancient laws to the changes which since their date
society itself has undergone."
91. S.Q. 1915, 5 Geo. V, c. 74.
92. S.Q. 1969, c. 77.
93. See also J. MERRYMAN, THE CivIL LAW TRADITION 2 (1969): "a set of deeply
rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the role of law in the society and in
the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about
the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught."
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ing with a draft report by a Committee of experts and providing for
a broad program of consultation of various kinds, both professional
and general.
A.

THE REVISION OFFICE COMMITTEES

The basis of our modus operandi lies in the report of a Committee of experts. To this date, some twenty-six regular and five special
Committees have been constituted to each of which a part of the Civil
Law or related subjects94 has been entrusted.
A Committee generally comprises from three to seven members
representing the various branches of the profession: practitioners
(members of Bar and of the Order of Notaries), judges and professors
of law. Care is also taken to ensure, according to the type of reform
area to be dealt with, representation of various interests, opinions and
groups: geographic, linguistic, religious and age groups.
The Committees are provided with research assistants and consultants. They may also invite specialists or groups in legal or other
fields to provide them with expert advice or relevant information.
Each Committee deals with a particular area of the Civil Law or
related topic and its main function is to prepare, generally on the
basis of a report by the Rapporteur or a Research assistant, a draft
"A vant-projet" and an "Expos6 des motifs" in both French and English.
B.

PUBLICATION OF THE COMMITTEE REPORTS

The reports of the Committees are published. It has always been
my firm belief that such a wholesale revision cannot be done, as it
were, between the four walls of a law library by and for jurists.
The drafts must be tested against public opinion-both general
and professional, both at home and abroad. And so it is that about
1,800 copies of each report95 are sent for comment and criticism to the
Courts, the Law schools, the various government departments, the
professional bodies (Bar and Notaries), as well as to all kinds of
organizations such as political parties, religious bodies, universities,
banks, trusts, insurance companies, boards of trade, labour unions,
social agencies, local community groups, women's organizations, and
to certain individuals who have manifested an interest in law reform.
94. Such as the creation of a central Registry relating to matrimonial regimes; the
creation of a Family Court; the establishment of a modern system of registration of
Persons and Property, Public Curatorship.
95. Twenty-five such reports-the Yellow reports-have already been published.
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And, of course, to the press and other news media.
Public hearings are also held, when necessary and appropriate,
so as to allow those who have submitted briefs to make known their
views and even to air and discuss among themselves their opposing
views.
It is then the responsibility of the Committee to examine their
report in the light of comments received and to prepare the final draft
of its report to be included in the Projet.
In certain instances, however, when a reform is deemed urgent
in a particular area, a report is submitted to the Government with a
recommendation for immediate implementation, without awaiting
the complete revision of the Code. To this date, twelve such reports
have inspired legislation on such matters as the capacity of married
women,96 marriage covenants,97 adoption,98 civil marriages, 9 rights of
natural parents and children,10° judicial declarations of deaths, 1 1
03
rights over one's body or cadaver,' abolition of civil degradation,
and lease and hire of things"
C.

FINAL PHASE OF COORDINATION

The bringing together of all these reports into one general cohesive draft project requires a great deal of coordination in respect of
both substance and form.
One can indeed easily imagine that with some thirty Committees
comprising more than one hundred men and women representing
different sectors and generations of the profession, one can hardly
expect that they always and on all subjects speak with one voice!
It is for this reason that two coordinating committees have been
constituted: a Committee on legal vocabulary and the final Coordination Committee. The first Committee is entrusted with the task of
reading each Committee report so as to ensure uniformity of style and
terminology in both languages. The second Committee will sit on
matters of conflicting points of substance so as to provide uniformity
and organic unity in the basic policies of the Code.
96. S.Q. 1964, c. 66.

97. S.Q. 1969, c. 77.
98. S.Q. 1969, c. 64.
99. S.Q. 1968, c. 82.
100. S.Q. 1970, c. 62.
101. S.Q. 1969, c. 79.
102. S.Q. 1971, c. 84.
103. S.Q. 1971, c. 84.
104. S.Q. 1973, c. 74.
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It is hoped that all these efforts will finally come to fruition in
the year of grace 1975 when the Projet of a new Civil Code will be
submitted to the Minister of Justice and, hopefully, adopted by the
National Assembly of Quebec.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Such then are the difficulties, the objectives and the methods of
operation of the Civil Law reform efforts in Quebec. It is my sincere
belief that if these endeavours finally meet with success, they may
well serve as a basis for a vigorous renaissance of the Civil Law in
Quebec.
Such a development will only occur if it is well understood that
a codification is not a panacea, that it is not meant to decide on issues
for all times. There are dangerous precedents in this regard. We are
told that Solon proclaimed his laws in force for one hundred years. '°5
Again Napoleon is reported to have said of his Code: "S'il est le
'
r~sultatexact de la justice civile, ilsera &ternel."
I suppose one can understand law-makers being tempted to say
as Horace '07 did in one of his Odes:
Exegi monumentum aere perennius
Regalique situ pyrarnidum altius
Quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens
Possit dirvere aut innumerabilis
Annorum series et fuga temporum. '0
This may be true of temples and of works of art, but a Code is
not a monument; or if it is, it must be a living monument, susceptible
of adaptation to the ever changing needs of society.
It was once said that law is Life. It must also be understood that
as life marches on, so must the Civil Law.
105. See Plutarque, Vie de Solon in 1 LES VIES DES HOMMES
106. See J. LoCR9, ESPRIT DU CODE NAPOLEON 85 (1805).

ILLUSTRES

107. 3 THE ODES XXX.
108. The Complete Works of Horace 90 (J. Marshall trans. 1911).
"A monument I've achieved more strong than brass,
Soaring kings' pyramids to overpass;
Which not corroding raindrop shall devour,
Or winds that from the North sweep down in power,
Or years unnumbered as the ages flee!"

201 (1951).

1974]

CIVIL CODE REVISION IN QUEBEC

APPENDIX
ABBREVIATIONS

B.R.
C.

C.A.
C.S.
Can. Bar Rev.
Eliz.
Geo.
Inter-Am. L. R.
(Imp.)
La. Civ. Code
Que. Civ. Code
R. du B.
R. du D.
R. du N.
R.L.n.s.
R.S.C.
R.S.O.
R.S.Q.
S.C.R.
S. Can.

S.Q.
Tul. L. R.
Vict.

Banc de la Reine
chapter
Cour d'Appel
Cour Sup6rieure
Canadian Bar Review
Elizabeth
George
Inter-American Law Review
Imperial
Louisiana Civil Code
Quebec Civil Code
Revue du Barreau
Revue du Droit
Revue du Notariat
La Revue Lgale (Nouvelle S6rie)
Revised Statutes of Caiada
Revised Statutes of Ontario
Revised Statutes of Quebec
Supreme Court Reports
Statutes of Canada
Statues of Quebec
Tulane Law Review
Victoria

